Observations about Soldiers' Experiences of Killing in War

by Pete Kilner (@combat_ethics)

Killing the enemies of our country in war is something that has to be done, but it’s not something that soldiers talk about much, especially with civilians. To help the next generation of soldiers prepare for combat as well as help the American people understand what soldiers experience, I offer these observations, which I have gleaned informally from hundreds of interviews and conversations with soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as with veterans back home. (The list is not in any particular order.)

1. Soldiers join the Army to defend their country. They kill in war to protect their buddies and accomplish their mission.
2. The American soldier is much better at reacting to contact than at initiating contact. Maybe it’s their training, maybe it’s a cultural thing about not throwing the first punch. Yet once the enemy engages us and crosses that threshold, they are lethal. (This aversion to engaging before being engaged diminishes with combat experience.)
3. Firefights are terrifying and exciting.  In the frightening kill-or-be-killed situation of close combat, it’s a thrilling relief to come out on top.
4. It’s validating for a combat-arms soldier to kill an enemy combatant. Having trained for so long and heard so many war stories from their respected small-unit leaders, they feel proud to have demonstrated their professional competence under fire and thus joined the ranks of combat-proven soldiers.
5. Once the personal threat has passed (e.g., the patrol is done, the deployment complete, or the war ends), soldiers’ attitudes toward killing become more subdued.  The cost in lives is weighed against what was accomplished by that mission, that deployment, that war.
6. When talking about killing an enemy combatant, soldiers tend to avoid the term “killed.” Instead, they “took him out,” “took care of him,” “dropped him,” “eliminated” him--the list of euphemisms is long. On the other hand, they never describe the accidental battlefield killing of a noncombatant by anything other than “killed.”
7. Leaders who issue orders that result in the deaths of enemy combatants feel a strong sense of responsibility for those deaths. As one lieutenant put it, “I never killed anyone with my personal weapon, but I killed people” [through his soldiers carrying out his orders]. Even leaders who merely authorized indirect fires or drops from fast movers can feel a strong sense of responsibility for the resulting deaths.
8. Soldiers make judgments about the moral responsibility of the enemy they kill. The more that an enemy combatant is actively engaging in a threatening action (i.e., pointing a weapon, emplacing an IED) and is likely to understand what he is doing (i.e., isn’t a child), the better it feels to kill them.
9. When one of their fellow soldiers is killed, their determination to kill the enemy increases. Payback is a primal instinct.
10. For units heading out on dangerous, enemy-focused missions, “Let’s go kill some bad guys” is a motivating mantra for overcoming the fear.
11. Some soldiers, once they have killed in war, decide that they can’t/won’t kill again.  I came across this situation in several combat-arms battalions, and I found their commands to be remarkably understanding, moving them off the line into staff positions. As one infantry company commander told me, “Not everyone is cut out to be an infantryman, and some don’t realize it until they’ve killed.”
12. Soldiers who are hunters seem to be less bothered by killing in war.
13. It’s not uncommon for the faces of enemy combatants that soldiers killed to appear in their dreams. The deceased don’t condemn; they are merely present. Even when the soldier never saw the person’s face, he knows who it is.
14. Combat veterans prefer not to tell their family members and civilian friends that they killed in war. If asked, they answer matter of factly and move on. When acquaintances and strangers ask, soldiers lie or ignore them; they have no right to know. Those who haven’t experienced combat couldn’t possibly understand what it means to kill another human being, and soldiers want to be looked at for the ends they pursued (protecting the innocent) not for the means they used (killing enemy combatants).

There may not be a single combat veteran who agrees with all of these observations; people process experiences differently. But I can assure you that each of these themes emerged from the voices of soldiers who have killed in defense of our country.

I invite you to comment with your own observations on this topic.

I am a former enlisted infantryman and infantry officer who interviewed more than 370 junior officers in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2003-2011 about their combat-leadership experiences, which often included killing. I also maintain a military-ethics blog (http://soldier-ethicist.blogspot.com) that has connected me to many more veterans, especially those who are reflecting on the morality of war. I never commanded troops in war and I’ve never killed anyone.

Updated 10-29-2018 to use third-person voice.

Disclaimer: The ideas expressed in this post are entirely my own and do not reflect the views or policy of West Point, the US Army, or the Department of Defense.

War Needs a Better Tagline

Long before I ever read the classic On War by Prussian war theorist Carl von Clausewitz, I was familiar with its most famous line--the one in which Clausewitz says, “War is merely the continuation of politics by other means.”

Yes, I realize that Clausewitz offered dialectic arguments and his insights on war are profound and nuanced, but my concern is that many citizens--and more importantly, politicians--to the extent that they know anything about a theory of war, accept uncritically what they have heard--that “war is merely the continuation of politics by other means.”  It’s not Clausewitz’s fault (nor anyone else’s) that his complex theory has been reduced in popular culture to a superficial tagline, but it has, and the result, I think, is morally problematic.

The German term that Clausewitz used, Politik, can mean “politics” or “policy.”  Both meanings of the term discount the importance of a war being morally justified.

Is war merely policy?  I think not. The decision to go to war is distinct from all other expressions of policy in that it forces people to kill and be killed on a large scale. Diplomatic statements are policy; tariffs and economic sanctions are policy. Although those types of policy affect people (and thus have an ethical component), they do not directly result in the intentional, large-scale killing of human beings, which wars inevitably do. War, then, should not be viewed as one tool among many in international policymaking; rather, war should be viewed as a last resort, to be utilized only when all other policies have failed to protect the people’s fundamental human rights.

Is war merely politics? Listening to our politicians, many of whom appear to base their war-authorization votes on the whims of poll results and the election cycle, one wonders if they do indeed view war as mere politics--as a means to help them and their party increase their political power. That wouldn't mean that they are necessarily bad people; they might be good people who know little about the moral reality of war and thus treat it as they do any other issue with political implications.

So, what might be a better, more ethical tagline for war? One that keeps at the forefront of everyone’s minds the fact that any decision to go to war must overcome a high moral hurdle? My first cut is:

“War is a last-resort defense of collective human rights.”

What do you think of this tagline? What do you think war’s tagline should be? I invite and welcome your critique and suggestions.

Excellent article on Moral Injury in ARMY magazine

Written by an active-duty Army officer, this article concisely describes the problems created when military forces lose sight of addressing the deep moral issues that are inherent in war.

"Moral Injury: What leaders don't mention when they talk of war" by LTC Douglas A. Pryer.

Army magazine (September 2014), 34-36.

http://tinyurl.com/mvy7w5o 

I tip my cap to Doug and to Army Magazine for such an important contribution.

Ethical Failures in the GWOT

3 policy-based ethical failures by the US in our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan

I’ve had the privilege to observe and interview hundreds of Soldiers at their combat outposts in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003. As someone who cares deeply about ethical conduct in war, I can assure you that the conduct of the overwhelming majority of US Soldiers over the past decade has been nothing short of inspiring. Despite very challenging conditions, American Soldiers consistently maintain their humanity and act with justice and compassion. On numerous occasions, Iraqis and Afghans have told me they wish that their own security forces would treat them as well as US forces do.

Although our rank-and-file Soldiers on the ground have acted honorably, our senior decision makers have a more checkered record.  There have been moral failings that we ought to acknowledge, learn from, and never repeat.

1. Torture (aka, enhanced interrogation procedures). This was perpetrated primarily by non-military OGAs (other government agencies such as the CIA) and contractors, but the practice tarnished the reputation of our nation and military (by association). It also set a terrible example and precedent. The temptation for Soldiers to mistreat a detainee who, for example, may have just killed one of their friends is very difficult to resist; it feels like every cell in your body demands payback.  Time and again, however, our Soldiers overcame temptation, exercised restraint, and chose the harder (moral) right over the easier (emotional) wrong. It’s a shame that the laudable ethical conduct of the uniformed many has been overshadowed by the unprofessional conduct of the non-uniformed few.

2. Contractors using lethal force.  It’s acceptable for contractors on secure bases to provide logistical support in war--to wash the clothes, repair the vehicles, etc. But contractors have NO PLACE on the battlefield. They should not be providing personal security to officials who travel outside the wire. They should not be running convoys, flying helicopters, or doing anything else where they are armed and likely to use their weapons. US Army Soldiers are professionals of arms--serving the nation, accountable to the people through their chain of command, trained in and committed to the ethical use of force.  Armed contractors, on the other hand, are mercenaries--serving their commercial enterprises, accountable to no one except their supervisors, and trained in the use of force, but not necessarily in its ethical use. Permitting contractors to perform warfighting tasks on the battlefield is an insult to the profession of arms and has proven harmful to US interests and moral standing. Only trained, accountable, ethical, professional Soldiers should be engaging in combat operations.

3. Senior military leaders being transported around the battlespace in armed, unmarked vehicles. A fundamental principle of the morality and legality of war is “discrimination” (or noncombatant immunity). In war, all combatants have the duty to discriminate between combatants and noncombatants: enemy combatants may be targeted, but noncombatants may not. This is why international law requires military personnel in a war zone to wear distinctive uniforms and to travel in distinctive, marked vehicles. The uniforms and markings enable combatants to know who is a legitimate target and who isn’t. The law protects noncombatants.

Regrettably, senior U.S. military leaders routinely travel around Afghanistan in custom-built, armored, unmarked SUVs, as they have since the start of the war. To an observer (such as an IED triggerman atop a mountain), these armored vehicles look like any other SUV used by a well-funded governmental, commercial, or NGO official. A case could be made that the customized SUVs are more maneuverable and practical on city streets, and that is true.  But there’s no excuse for not marking the vehicles clearly as military transport.

In 2009 I took a civilian airline flight out of Kabul. In the plane, a European who worked for an NGO recognized me as an American and complained bitterly to me bitterly her NGO’s workers were being killed in attacks by insurgents because of the US military’s practice of transporting senior military leaders in unmarked, civilian-looking vehicles. Her food-aid colleagues routinely traveled in caravans of large SUVs to transport supplies to remote villages. However, because senior US and Afghan leaders also traveled in convoys of large SUVs, insurgents sometimes mistook a food-aid NGO convoy as a US military convoy and attacked it.  According to the woman, our disregard for international military law indirectly resulted in the deaths of noncombatants.

Back in the US, I asked a JAG Colonel who was familiar with the practice how senior leaders could flaunt the law like this.  

“A memo was written giving a legal opinion that authorized it,” he said.

“On what legal basis? What’s the argument?” I asked him. “How does military personnel traveling in unmarked, armed vehicles not constitute a violation of the laws of war?”

He shrugged his shoulders and repeated without conviction, “A memo was written that authorized it. That’s all I can say about the situation.”

The United States can and must do better. We should not make exceptions for ourselves.  Wars are moral endeavors--battles by good against evil.  We should not undermine our moral authority by violating laws of war.  We are good enough at our profession to win with honor.

Double Effect at the Soldier Level

I've been working with the Army HQ to develop training modules that increase Soldiers' resilience during and after combat.  Specifically, I'm an SME on the "Resilience on the Battlefield" modules that address the moral justification of killing, the psychological effects of killing, and moral injury. The Army is adopting and will be teaching my "bubble theory" approach to explaining the moral justification of killing in war, which is pretty exciting and a big step forward in empowering Soldiers to fight morally and live well psychologically.

One cool aspect of these modules, which are being developed under the leadership of CH (LTC) Stephen Austin, is that they integrate philosophical ethics into practical training for Soldiers. I was asked to explain the concept of the Doctrine of Double Effect, which is so essential to helping Soldiers navigate the crappy, morally troubling situations in combat when their actions will foreseeably lead to harm to noncombatants.  Here's my first draft, and I welcome your feedback.

Doctrine of Double Effect Scenario

You are a squad leader on a dismounted patrol.  Vehicles with heavy machineguns and automatic grenade launchers are in overwatch.  While crossing an open field with limited cover, your lead fire team comes under effective enemy machinegun fire from a building that appears to be house.  Based on intel and your observations, you estimate 4-6 enemy personnel in the building. You see five women and children run for cover into the same building that the MG fire is coming from. Based on your knowledge of the area, you think it’s likely that up to 4 more noncombatants may be in the building. You are able to identify the location of the machinegun position, on the second (top) floor on the north side of the house.  What should you do?  You want to kill or capture the enemy (that is your commander’s intent) without harming the noncombatants.

As you consider your options, you realize that there’s a high likelihood of collateral damage—mortal or serious injury to the noncombatants trapped in the building.  Your action will likely have two effects—the good one that you intend (destroying the enemy), and a bad one that you don’t intend yet realize is likely (harming noncombatants).  In such a situation, a thought process known as the Doctrine of Double Effect can help you choose a morally justifiable course of action.

Given that your commander’s intent is to gain and maintain enemy contact in order to kill or capture enemy personnel, you identify three possible courses of action:

A. call for indirect fires to destroy the house

B. call the vehicles to come forward to provide heavier direct fires

C. maneuver your trail fire team to gain a better position to provide more effective  fire

To assess the morality of each COA, you should give it a 5-part “test.”

1. Is the nature of the action I’m considering legal and moral? This shouldn’t be an issue, because all the weapons that the Army provides its soldiers are legal and moral to use. However, if one of your soldiers were to have created his own poison grenade, for example, such a weapon by its nature is prohibited by the laws of warfare, and consequently that COA would be immoral and you should reject it.

2. Do you really intend only the good effect?  This is a self check, to examine your own motives. If you are angry at the residents of that household from a previous incident and really want to see them be killed, then you ought to think hard to discern your true motivation as you choose a COA. On the other hand, if you really hope only to kill the enemy without harm to the noncombatants, then you pass this step.

3. Is the bad effect the means to the good effect? It shouldn’t be. If a COA you are considering uses the collateral damage to achieve destruction of the enemy—for example, involves shooting children to draw the enemy out to retrieve the wounded children—then the COA is immoral and illegal.

4. Is the expected good effect worth the expected bad effect?  In this case, is the destruction of the enemy and the safety of your soldiers “worth” harming noncombatants who have not forfeited their right not to be killed?  The larger situation plays a role here.  Is it a COIN fight where the people are the center of gravity?  Or is it a high-intensity war where its swift resolution will save lives in the long run? How important is this mission; can I withdraw and allow everyone to live to fight another day?

5. Finally, does my COA accept some reasonable risk to my soldiers in order to minimize risk to noncombatants?  This can be tough to do, but when we consider that our ultimate purpose as soldiers is to protect human rights (which are the moral foundation of the US Constitution to which we swear allegiance), and that we volunteered to risk our lives to do so, then our actions on the battlefield should reflect those values.

With this test in mind, let’s consider COA’s A, B, and C.

Test#1: All COAs are legal in themselves—indirect, heavy-weapon, and small-arms fires are all legal means to wage battle.

Test#2: Only you know the answer, but as a good person we will assume that you genuinely wish that the women and children and other noncombatants will not be harmed by your actions.

Test#3: In none of the COA’s is harm to the noncombatants the means to destroying the enemy combatants.

Test #4: Each COA will produce a different expected outcome. 

COA-A, employing indirect fires, will likely kill or seriously wound everyone in the building—estimated at 4-6 enemy and 5-9 civilians. Your soldiers face minimal risk with this COA.

COA-B, using the heavy weapons from the trucks, will provide more precise effects that should still accomplish the good effect but will likely cause some collateral damage, although less than the artillery would. Maneuvering the trucks closer puts the soldiers in them at more risk.

COA-C, maneuvering your own fire team to attempt to gain fire superiority with weapons that are most precise is least likely to cause collateral damage, but puts your own soldiers at highest risk among  the COAs.

Test #5 demands that you minimize the risk of the bad effect by putting some risk on your own combatants.  COA-A fails that test.  COA-C may (not necessarily) fail that test if the maneuver puts your fire team at great risk.

Ok, thoughtful readers: what's missing from this explanation? 

Pre-deployment Ethics Seminars

On October 16-18, 2012, I had one of my most meaningful experiences as a military ethicist.  I travelled to Ft. Campbell, KY, and conducted a series of three one-day leader-development seminars for soldiers who will be deploying to Afghanistan in the upcoming weeks.

Several months ago, COL J.P. McGee, the commander of the 1^st Brigade Combat Team, 101^st Airborne Division who happens to be a West Point classmate of mine, asked if I would help his soldiers (about 4,000 in his brigade) prepare ethically and psychologically for their deployment.  This is COL McGee’s eighth combat deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan over the past decade, and over the course of his experiences he has become convinced that restrained, ethical conduct in war is vitally important, for several reasons:

1. Ethical conduct provides a huge operational advantage.  Being “the good guys” in societies that lack legitimate institutions wins us public support and sets the conditions for even our enemies to reconcile and partner with us.  He points out that the Anbar Awakening/Sons of Iraq movement, in which Iraq’s tribal Sunni insurgents (not Al-Qaeda in Iraq or other inherently murderous insurgents) partnered with us in 2006-07 and began to participate peacefully in Iraqi governance, would have been impossible if we’d had a history of mistreating Sunni detainees or civilians.  Being “good” when other parties weren’t set the conditions that later allowed us to win an unexpected victory.

2. Ethical conduct protects our soldiers’ psyches/souls.  In the craziness of a combat deployment, our soldiers will do what we ask them to do; they trust their leaders. After a deployment, they will reflect on their actions.  People know right from wrong. If they have acted immorally during the deployment, they will be wracked with guilt and shame.  If their leaders led them to act immorally, they will feel used and betrayed.  If, on the other hand, they conducted themselves with honor under the stresses of combat, they will feel great pride in themselves and gratitude to their leaders.

3. Ethical conduct maintains a unit’s honor. Soldiers are entrusted to maintain their unit’s honor.  In the case of that brigade (327^th Infantry Regiment), American soldiers have been fighting honorably under its colors since World War I.  The brigade’s nickname, “Bastogne,” was earned in its heroic defense of that town during WWII’s Battle of the Bulge.  COL McGee pointed out that every “Bastogne” soldier has the privilege and responsibility to live up to and to carry forward the unit’s honor.  The unit’s honor is bigger than any one soldier; it has been earned by the ethical and courageous conduct of thousands of soldiers before them over almost 100 years.  Yet, the unit’s honor can be sullied by unethical conduct by even one of its members.  He pointed out that, in his study of war crimes, three factors are almost always present: a “bad actor” with a criminal/sociopathic flaw; weak leaders supervising them; and others who had concerns but didn’t intervene.  He told his soldiers to be alert—to identify and remove morally-flawed soldiers; not to tolerate weak leaders; and to trust their guts and intervene if they see either of the first two factors.

4. Being good is good in itself.  We should always act morally and in accordance with our personal and national values, especially when they are tested by adversity.

COL McGee and I put together a 6-hour, one-day professional-development seminar, which we ran on three consecutive days for different battalions.  Each session was attended by 60-120 leaders, and about 220 leaders in all participated.

Each seminar consisted of five events, which roughly followed this timeline:

0900-1015: “A moral justification for killing in war.”  I presented my explanation on the morality of killing, which I’ve written about in this blog. For almost all the soldiers, this was the first time they’d heard the subject addressed, and it was well received.

1025-1130: “Ethics and mentoring Afghan Security Forces.” The purpose of this session was to practice ethical decision making skills, especially as they apply to advising Afghan forces.  We used the Leader Challenge Method developed by the Center for the Advancement of Leader Development & Organizational Learning (CALDOL) at West Point.  Participants were seated at tables in groups of four.  We all watched a video in which a US soldier who was partnered with ANSF describes an actual situation he faced in which one of the Afghan police on a joint patrol was acting unethically. In their small groups, the soldiers addressed three questions: “If you were in this situation, what are all the factors that you should consider?”  “What are different courses of action you could take?”  Then, after moving to different tables/groups, each answered the question, “What would you actually do?” I had one leader come forward and we role-played his course of action. We then repeated the process with another real, recent scenario on this topic.

1145-1245: COL M shared his “Thoughts on Ethics,” which included three topics: Why Ethics Matter; Ethics when dealing with local national forces; and Dealing with casualties.  He convincingly made the case that ethical conduct is absolutely essential—for the reasons cited above.  As one noncommissioned officer commented to me afterwards, “The commander has a way of making you see things different and changing your mind. He’s one smart guy.” COL McGee recognized that his leaders would have to exercise judgment in working with the Afghans, but he also clearly defined the boundaries of ANSF conduct that the BCT would not tolerate.

The brigade commander provides guidance on ethics to his subordinate leaders

1400-1500: “Dealing with casualties.” How a unit deals with the casualties it sustains has a large impact on its conduct.  COL McGee told his leaders to expect casualties, to be prepared to lead their soldiers through the experience, and to carry on and complete the mission our country has called on them to accomplish.  We showed a gut-wrenching video of a leader describing the day that one of his soldiers was killed, another paralyzed, and two others wounded. Then, at their tables, the participants discussed:  “What emotions should we expect to experience when one of our Soldiers is killed?” “For each emotion, what can leaders do to channel that emotion productively?” Then we showed a video of a commander describing how her unit in Afghanistan responded to a catastrophic event in which four of their own were killed by an IED.  In small groups, the leaders discussed their response to her unit’s courses of action. Many, if not most, of the soldiers in attendance have experienced casualties, so they brought their own experiences into the small-group discussions.

1515-1600: We ended the day by addressing a topic that was on everyone’s minds—the threat of green-on-blue (ANSF on US/coalition) attacks.  We showed a video of a leader in AFG describing a situation in which ANA and US soldiers raised weapons at each other. Once again, using the LC methodology, in their small groups the soldiers shared their ideas on: “If you were in this situation, what are all the factors that you should consider?”  “What are different courses of action you could take?”  Then, after moving to different tables/groups, each answered the question, “What would you actually do?”  Participants who had experienced similar situations on previous deployments had the opportunity to share their experiences with the entire group. Then, we watched a video clip on how the situation actually worked out.  A clear consensus emerged on the merits of de-escalating such situations, as well as ttps on how to accomplish that.

After the Yellow Ribbon Conference

This weekend I attended the After the Yellow Ribbon conference at the Duke Divinity School. 

Put together by OIF-vet, conscientious objector, and Duke Divinity student Logan Mehl-Laituri and fellow Divinity student Alaina Kleinbeck, it was an interdisciplinary event that included ecclesial, medical (mental health) and military perspectives in conversation devoted to helping veterans make sense of the moral reality of war.

I learned something from everyone there. The speakers who inspired me the most were Dr Warren Kinghorn (from the Veterans Admin and Duke) and Dr David Miller, a fair-minded and well-spoken pacifist.  I was privileged to give the keynote address and later have the opportunity to give my presentaton on "the moral justification for killing in war" to the majority-pacifist audience.

The goal of the event was to come together, talk honestly and listen openly, and find common ground so we all can help heal those vets who experienced moral injury in war. IMHO, it succeeded beautifully.  This conference showed me that just warists and war pacifists can come together productively.

BBC article and my upcoming deployment

Life is funny.  On the day that I leave my regular work (at a desk) and begin the process of deploying to Afghanistan, the BBC runs an article that quotes me, resulting in a deluge of emails and comments at a time when I have little opportunity to engage online.

I spoke with the BBC correspondent, Stephen Evans, more than four years ago when he visited West Point.

So, I ask that those who write me to have patience; my internet connectivity will be limited for the next couple months at least.  I will reply to each of you as I am able.  In fact, next year (summer 12-spring 13) I plan on taking a sabbatical to write a book on ethics in war, so I will (finally) have time to focus, think and write, and I will re-read all the good ideas I've received over the years on this blog.

Here at the replacement center at Ft Benning, GA, I've already enjoyed great conversations with an Army lawyer and an Army doctor about moral decisionmaking.  (The doc even shares my interest in exploring complexity theory and ethics.) Within 10 days, I'll be privileged to hear the stories, experiences, and perspectives of our soldiers who are engaged in the fight.  I am blessed to have such opportunities, and I will do my best to use tleverage my experiences to contribute to the wider conversation on war and morality.

Yours in the search for Truth,

pete

Unspoken ethical norms in war

I've had the privilege to interview more than 300 junior officers in Iraq and Afghanistan, and I have been very impressed and inspired by their deep commitment to leading their soldiers to fight morally.  Combat requires  moral decisionmaking--there's no getting around it--and our leaders overwhelmingly mean well.

However, I have also observed that many leaders and soldiers feel unprepared for the life-or-death decisions they have had to make in "gray" circumstances.  Their pre-deployment training consisted too often of black-or-white scenarios written by Army lawyers who've never had to make decisions in the fog of war. So, our soldiers learn by doing, trusting their gut instincts and character, and they generally do remarkably well.

The soldiers I interview describe their most uselful preparation for combat moral decisionmaking as being their reading of memoirs or other accounts of battle, and movies.  Band of Brothers, Saving Private Ryan, With the Old Breed, etc gave them a sense of the decisions they would have to make.

Of course, real accounts of battle are descriptive, not prescriptive...and real descriptions of war are full of events that would be war crimes by legal, media, and other dominant but uninformed-about-war parties.

In my interviews, which are one-on-one, confidential conversations in the war zone, I've noticed that soldiers who are doing the fighting have their own set of ethical standards.  In most cases and most situations, their ethical norms are consistent with what is expected publicly of them--be gentle with detainees, do not discriminate against local national civilians even if you know they support (not materially) the enemy, use gov't funds IAW all the regulations, leave interrogations to the trained interrogators, put the mission first, etc. 

Yet there are times and situations in which soldiers judge "what's right" on the ground to be much different than the public ethics.  Sometimes, soldiers "interrogate" detainees whom they are authorized only to tactically question; sometimes they use funds for purposes not authorized; sometimes they put more risk on civilians whom they know support the enemy; on occasion, they insure that someone they've detained will never able to kill the innocent again.

Each of these action violates the "public ethics" of the US military (and some the Laws of Land Warfare)...yet I've heard well reasoned, convincing moral arguments for them.  The problem is, our soldiers cannot ever say publicly what they did, much less offer their reasons, without making themselves liable to legal proceedings.  As a result, the next generations of soldiers will continue to be unprepared for the complex, difficult moral decisions they will face in war. It's a catch-22.

So, the profession of arms has two moral codes--the public one, based on black-and-white legal rules, that work much of the time; and a private code, known only by those who have to do the messy work of war.

It's not healthy psychologically to have made difficult moral decisions that you cannot talk about publicly for fear of being punished.

It's also dangerous to have such "unspoken" rules of war that differ from what soldiers are taught in formal training.  For example,inexperienced young leaders (2LT platoon leaders) can have trouble enforcing standards when they are not confident that they know the true standards.

I am going to develop a paper on this topic that I'll present at the New Mexico Military Institute in October, and I plan to refine it and present it again at the American Society of Military Ethics meeting in January.

More to follow, but I thought I'd put the ideas out there and solicit your feedback.  You can always write me privately at pgkilner@gmail.com  if you want to share your experiences and ideas on this or any topic related to moral decisionmaking in the military context.

Diminished moral responsibility of many enemy combatants

The straightforward examples used in my baseline argument for the moral justification for killing in war are not representative of many of the enemy combatants that we kill in the current wars. Many of those attackingIndigenous Security Forces or Coalition Forces (the good guys) are doing so solely to pay the bills, to put food on the table; others are uneducated and misinformed about the goals of each side in the wars. In other words, many of the attackers are not fully morally responsible for their actions. In terms of domestic self defense, they are more like: a drug addict who commits armed robbery and murder to finance his addiction; or a mentally disabled person who watched a violent movie, came across a loaded weapons, and is now “living the fantasy” by shooting innocent people; or like a man who mistakenly thinks that you raped and killed his mother and is coming to kill you.

In such cases, I think, we would say that using lethal force to stop the attack and protect the lives of innocent people is indeed still morally justified…but it is not satisfying, and is even tragic. When an attacker is not completely responsible for his life-threatening actions, it is sad—but nonetheless necessary and morally justified—to use lethal force in defense of the innocent.